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Abstract
In this paper, we expand on the seminal work of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and
Topel (1991) and reinvestigate the returns to seniority in the U.S. We begin with the
same wage equation as in previous studies. We extend the model of Hyslop (1999)
and explicitly model the participation/employment and interfirm mobility decisions,
which, in turn, define the individual’s experience and seniority. We introduce into the
wage equation a summary of the workers’ entire career path. The three-equation sys-
tem is estimated simultaneously using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). We find that for each of the three education groups studied the returns to
seniority are larger than those previously found in the literature.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the relative importance of the
returns to firm-specific seniority (or tenure) versus general labor market experience.
Since the theoretical models proposed in the literature give rise to both alternatives,
the resolution of the debate falls to the empirical studies. To date, the empirical
literature has struggled to reach a consensus. This paper offers a new perspective to
this debate and provides several explanations to conflicting findings in past research.
While there has been little disagreement about the importance of the return to ex-
perience, there has been an ongoing debate about the contribution of the return to
tenure to wage growth among individuals in the U.S. For example, Topel (1991) finds
strong evidence for large returns to seniority. In contrast, Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
(AS, hereafter) and Altonji and Williams (2005) (AW, hereafter) find little returns
to seniority.
In previous literature, much of the focus on the returns to seniority has concen-
trated on the possible endogeneity of job changes and its effect on the estimated return
to tenure. This paper goes one step further and considers the possible endogeneity
of labor market experience, and its potential effects on the estimated returns to both
tenure and experience. To address this key issue we develop a structural model in
which individuals make two key decisions, namely employment (or participation) and
interfirm mobility. In turn, these decisions influence the observed outcome of inter-
est, namely wages. Within this model we revisit the issue regarding the magnitude
of the returns to seniority in the U.S. and offer new perspectives. Most importantly,
the paper concludes that the returns to seniority are higher than those previously
reported in the literature, including those reported by Topel (1991).
Our formulation of the wage function, the general Mincer’s wage specification,
is the same as that taken by virtually all of the literature on this topic. In order
to account for the endogenous decisions of participation and mobility, we extend
the model of Hyslop (1999) and broaden it to include forward looking dynamic op-
timization search perspectives. This model gives rise to two reduced-form decision
equations: (1) a participation/employment;1 and (2) an interfirm mobility. In this
approach, experience and seniority are fully endogenized because they are direct out-
comes of the employment and interfirm mobility decisions, respectively. Hence, the
1In both the theoretical model and empirical analysis, participation is the same as employment.
We, therefore, use these two terms interchangeably throughout the paper.
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model accounts for the potential selection biases that stem from these endogenous de-
cisions, and thus allows one to consistently estimate the parameters associated with
the wage function, including the returns to tenure and experience.
To account for individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity we include person-specific
random correlated effects in the estimated equations. Controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity in this fashion creates important links between the individual’s decisions
and the outcome of interest (i.e., wage) that, if ignored, could lead to severe biases
in the estimated parameters of interest. Additional links between the equations are
present by the fact that the idiosyncratic random components in the equation are
also allowed to be contemporaneously correlated.
Our approach offers a unified framework with which one can address and re-
examine results that have been previously found in the literature. This is because
the statistical assumptions that are adopted in this study–along with the fact that
seniority and experience are endogenized–incorporate the most important elements
from many previous studies, particularly those studies by Topel (1991) and AW.2
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and estimate
the model for three separate education groups: high school drop-outs, high school
graduates and college graduates. We adopt a Bayesian approach and employ Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for estimating the joint posterior distribution
for the model’s parameters.
The results indicate that, while the estimated returns to experience are somewhat
higher than those previously found in the literature, they are of similar magnitude.
In contrast, the estimates of the returns to seniority are much higher than those
previously obtained, including those obtained by Topel (1991). Consequently, our
estimates of total within-job wage growth are significantly higher than Topel’s esti-
mates, and those reported by Abraham and Farber (1987) (AF, hereafter). This is
true for all three education groups analyzed in this study.
Our study also sheds light on several important factors leading to the apparent
differences between our estimates and those obtained in previous studies. First, the
results of our study highlight the importance of explicitly modeling the employment
and the mobility decisions, which, in turn, define experience and seniority. Second, we
establish the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity prevailing in the participa-
tion and mobility decisions, as well as in the wage function. Finally, we demonstrate
2There are a number of other papers in the literature, including Dustmann and Meghir (2005)
and Neal (1995), which analyzed similar questions.
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the need to explicitly control for job-specific components in the wage function, through
the introduction of a function that serves as a summary statistic for the individual’s
specific career path. This function captures the overall effect of the worker’s specific
career path on his/her market wage. We find that the magnitude of the estimated
returns changes markedly when we account for this factor, but the qualitative results
remain similar. This indicates that the timing of a job change during the course of
one’s career is important for his/her wage trajectory.
Our findings are different from those previously obtained in the literature. Hence,
we provide a number of robustness checks that are designed to ensure that these results
do not stem from reasons that are auxiliary to the substantive issues examined here.
First, we use two alternative prior distributions for the model’s parameters associated
with the returns to tenure and experience, centering them around the results obtained
by Topel (1991) and AS; the results remain virtually unchanged. Also, our sample
extract is somewhat different from that used by Topel (1991) and AS.We provide clear
evidence that the substantially distinct results obtained in this study are not driven
by the difference in samples. Specifically, when we apply the methods of Topel (1991)
and AS, we are able to closely replicate their results using our data extract.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a
brief review of the literature and highlight the crucial differences between the various
approaches. In Section 3, we present the model, which extends the model from Hyslop
(1999), while also incorporating other vital elements from the search literature. In
Section 4, we explain the econometric specification and briefly discuss the estimation
method. In Section 5 we provide a brief discussion of the data extract used in this
study. In Section 6 we present the empirical results and their implications. In Sec-
tion 7 we present concluding remarks. In a web appendix we provide mathematical
proofs, details about the numerical algorithms used and further descriptive analysis
of the modelling approach.3
2 Literature Review
There has been a long lasting debate in the literature on the magnitude of the returns
to seniority in the U.S. The results of Topel (1991), which indicate that there are large
returns to seniority, stand in stark contrast to those of AS and AF, which find virtually
3The Appendices are available in the Review of Economic Studies website under Supplementary
Material and in Buchinsky et al. (2005).
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no returns to seniority in the U.S. Topel (1991) finds strong evidence that the costs
of displacement are highly correlated with prior job tenure, a phenomenon that may
stem from the fact that: (a) wages rise with seniority; or (b) tenure merely acts as a
proxy for the quality of the job match.4 In order to examine this phenomenon, Topel
uses the following prototype model of wage determination:
yijt = Xijtβ1 + Tijtβ2 + ijt, (1)
where yijt is the log wage of individual i in job j at time t, Xijt denotes experience, and
Tijt denotes seniority. The residual term ijt is decomposed into three components:
ijt = φijt + μi + vijt, (2)
where φijt is specific to the individual-job pair, μi is a term that reflects the indi-
vidual’s ability and vijt is an idiosyncratic term representing market-wide random
shocks and/or measurement errors. The main problem in estimating the parameters
of interest β1 and β2 stems from the fact that φijt is likely to be correlated with
experience and/or tenure. In particular, because the match component φijt is likely
to increase with tenure, the estimate of β2, say bβ2, will be upward biased within a
simple ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation of (1). However, Topel also provides
a convincing argument regarding the composition of “movers” and “stayers” in the
data set which implied that, if the returns to seniority are positive (i.e., β2 > 0),
then bβ2 will be downward biased. Under the assumption that experience at the en-
try level is exogenous and, hence, uncorrelated with the error terms, Topel obtains
an unbiased estimate for β1 + β2 and an upward biased estimate for β1 (due to the
selection bias induced by not modeling the mobility decisions). Hence, he argues that
his estimate of β2, bβ2 = .0545, provides a lower bound for the returns to seniority.5
Note that if experience is not exogenous and is positively (negatively) correlated with
φijt because most mobile workers voluntarily (involuntarily) change jobs for better
(worse) matches, then the estimate of β1, say bβ1, will be upward (downward) biased.
In contrast, AS use an instrumental variables approach in which it is assumed
4An additional possibility, not explored by Topel, is that workers with long tenures are simply
more able.
5Topel (1991) also examined two additional sources of potential biases in the estimates of β1+β2.
Nevertheless, he finds that accounting for these potential biases had a very small effect on the
estimate for β2.
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(in Topel’s notation) that φijt = φij, i.e., the individual job-specific term is time-
invariant. Under this assumption, deviation of seniority from its average in a specific
job is a valid instrument for seniority. Since this method is a variant of Topel’s two-
step approach, it is not surprising that AS obtain an estimate for β1 + β2 that is
similar to that obtained by Topel. Nevertheless, AS’s procedure appears to induce
an upward bias in the IV estimate for β1, and hence a downward bias in the estimate
for β2. The problem is potentially magnified by two other factors: (a) measurement
error problem in the tenure data used by AS; and (b) differences in the treatment of
time trends in the regression.6
AF use a somewhat different set of assumptions. In particular, they use completed
tenure to proxy for the unobserved dimensions of the individual’s, or job’s, quality.
A problem with their approach is that many of the workers in their data extract have
censored spells of employment.7 While AW specify a model that is closer in spirit to
Topel’s model, their approach differs in some meaningful way. AW crucially rely on
the assumption that the match effect φ and time are independent, i.e., Cov(t, φ) = 0,
conditional on experience (or experience and tenure). This assumption is problematic,
especially in cases where workers have had more time to find jobs with higher φ.
Additionally, t may also be correlated with μ in (2) because of changes in the sample
composition.
One important conclusion from both Topel (1991) and AW is that individual
heterogeneity is an important factor of the wage growth process. It appears that
some of the reduction in the upward bias in the estimate for β1 in Topel (1991) is
due to a reduction in the bias that stems from individual heterogeneity.
In a recent paper, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) (DM, hereafter) allow for three
different sources of returns due to the accumulation of specific human capital, namely
experience, sector-specific seniority and firm-specific seniority.8 In order to estimate
the returns to experience, they use data of displaced workers in their new jobs, as-
suming that such workers could not predict closure of an establishment more than
6Topel uses a specific index for the aggregate changes in real wages by using data from the CPS.,
while AS used a simple time trend. Consequently, the growth of quality of jobs, due to better
matches over time, would cause an additional downward bias in the estimate of β2.
7Another source of difference arises because AF use a quadratic polynomial in experience when
estimating the log wage equation, whereas AS and Topel use a quartic specification.
8Neal (1995) and Parent (1999, 2000) also focus their investigation on the importance of sector-
and firm-specific human capital. We abstract from the sector-specific returns in order to avoid
modeling sectorial choices.
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a year in advance.9 Furthermore, under the assumption that displaced workers have
preferences for work similar to those that induced their sectorial choices, controlling
for the endogeneity of experience also controls for the endogeneity of sector tenure.
In a subsequent step DM estimate two reduced-form equations, one for experience
and the other for participation. The residuals from these two regressions are used as
regressors in the wage regression of the displaced workers. This allows DM to account
for possible sample selection biases induced by restricting attention to only the indi-
viduals staying with their current employer. Using data from Germany and the U.S.,
DM find that the returns to tenure for both skilled and unskilled workers are large.
The estimated returns to sector-specific tenure are much smaller, but statistically
significant.
In his survey paper, Farber (1999) notes the importance of modelling some specific
features of the mobility process. First, he shows that in the first few months of a job
there is an increase in the probability of job separation, which decreases steadily
thereafter. Farber provides strong evidence that contradicts the simple model of pure
unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that one must distinguish heterogeneity from
duration dependence. He also finds strong evidence that: (a) firms tend to lay off
less senior workers who have lower specific firm-capital; and (b) job losses result in
substantial permanent earnings losses.10
3 The Model
Our model extends Hyslop’s (1999) model by allowing workers to move directly from
one job to another, a key feature in the search literature. We show that under some
fairly general conditions–depending on the search cost, the mobility cost, and the
shape of the utility function–job-to-job transitions may occur. Moreover, this struc-
ture leads to a first-order state dependence in the participation and mobility processes.
Whether state dependence plays a major role in reality is largely an empirical ques-
tion that is examined below. The decision to stay non-employed, stay employed in
the same firm, move to an alternative job, or to become non-employed, depends on
the values of several state-dependent reservation wages. This model gives rise to an
econometric model with two selection equations (for the participation and interfirm
9For more on the empirical findings in the literature on displaced workers see also Addison and
Portugal (1989), Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Farber (1999).
10See also Gibbons and Katz (1991) for a further discussion of the latter point.
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mobility decisions) and a wage equation.
The wage function:
Our theoretical model builds on a specification of the wage function that has been
adopted generally in the literature. That is, the observed log wage equation for
individual i in job j at time t is:
wijt = w∗ijt · 1(yit = 1), and (3)
w∗ijt = x
0
wijtδ0 + εijt,
where xwijt is a vector of observed characteristics–including education, labor market
experience and seniority (or tenure)–of the individual in his/her current job, 1(·) is
the usual indicator function and yit = 1 if the ith individual participates in the labor
force at time t, and yit = 0 otherwise. Consequently, the wage offer, w∗ijt, is observed
only if the individual chooses to work.
We decompose the error term εijt into three components:
εijt = JWijt + αwi + ξijt, (4)
where αwi is a person-specific correlated random effect, analogous to μi in (2), and
ξijt is a contemporaneous idiosyncratic error term. The term JWijt is analogous to the
term φijt in (2), only that here it provides a summary statistic for the individual’s
work history and career. More precisely, JWijt captures the timing and magnitude of
all discontinuous jumps in the individual’s wages that resulted from all job changes
until date t.11
In principle, this function can be viewed as a full set of variables capturing all
observed jumps in the data. However, in the empirical application, this would require
estimation of a prohibitively large number of parameters. Thus, we approximate JWijt
by the following piece-wise linear function of experience and seniority at the time of
11In an analysis of matched employer-employee data for France, Abowd, Kramarz and Roux (2006)
find that entry wages depend upon seniority in the previous job, as well as the number of previous
jobs held by the individual.
8
a job change:12
JWijt = (φ
s
0 + φ
e
0ei0) di1 +
MitX
l=1
"
4X
k=1
(φk0 + φ
s
ksi,tl−1 + φ
e
kei,tl−1) dkitl
#
, (5)
where d1itl equals 1 if the lth job of the ith individual lasted less than a year and equals
0 otherwise. Similarly, d2itl = 1 if the lth job of the ith individual lasted between two
and five years, and equals 0 otherwise, d3itl = 1 if the lth job lasted between six and
ten years, and equals 0 otherwise, d4itl = 1 if the lth job lasted more than ten years
and equals 0 otherwise. Finally, Mit denotes the number of job changes by the ith
individual at time t (not including the individual’s first sample year). If an individual
changed jobs in the first sample year, then di1 = 1; otherwise di1 = 0. The quantities
eitl and sitl denote the individual’s experience and seniority in year tl, respectively,
when individual i leaves job l. Note that while the φ’s are fixed parameters, the size
of the jumps (within each of the four brackets of seniority) may differ depending on
the level of labor market experience and seniority at the time of a job change.13
Note that the JWijt function generalizes φijt in (2), and captures the initial condi-
tions specific to the individual at the start of a new job. In other words, this function
provides a measure of the opportunity wage of the worker if he/she were to move
to a new job at that point in his/her career. Inclusion of actual (rather than poten-
tial) labor market experience as a determinant of the initial earnings at a new job
allows one to distinguish between displaced workers, who went through a period of
non-employment after displacement, and workers who moved directly from one job
to another. Similarly, the inclusion of the seniority level at past jobs allows one to
control for the quality of the past job matches. Whether the frequency of changing
jobs and the individual’s labor market attachment matters is an empirical question
that we address below.14
12In a different context, Light and Ureta (1995) also addressed similar timing issue, but with
respect to experience. They discuss the role of experience in the early stages of one’s career and
highlight the importance of controlling for the exact timing of work experience when estimating
wage regressions.
13The JWijt function contains a total of 13 identifiable parameters corresponding to the four brackets
of seniority and the first sample year.
14Also, note that JWijt is individual-job specific. In general, there are several ways to define a job.
Our definition is a particular employment spell in one’s career. Hence, it is possible that different
individuals will have the same values for JWijt even though they may not be employed at the same
firm. This definition of a job is consistent with our modelling approach.
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The timing of information revelation and decisions:
The model is in discrete time. At the beginning of period t, an employed worker
receives a wage offer from his/her current firm. This wage offer consists of two com-
ponents. While one component is certain, the other is random. The first part is
x0wijtδ0+ JWijt +αwi. The second part, ξijt, is revealed just before the end of period t.
Its expected value is zero and it can be interpreted as a match-specific productivity
shock or as an incentive component of pay with the outcome being determined by
the worker’s behavior during period t. Hence, at the end of period t, after the two
components of wijt have been revealed, the worker decides whether to stay in the
firm, move to another firm, or become non-employed.15 It is clear that at the end of
period t the worker can only form an expectation about the exact wage that he/she
will be paid in the next period (period t+1) either at a potential new job j0, or at the
current job, j. These expectations, which the worker is fully informed of, are given
by x0wij0,t+1δ0+J
W
ij0,t+1+αwi and x
0
wij,t+1δ0+JWijt+1+αwi, respectively. Note that while
seniority in a new job j0 is, by definition, zero, it may still be the case that JWij0,t+1
would be larger than JWij,t+1. For simplicity we assume that, if one chooses to change
jobs an outside wage offer arrives in the next period with probability 1.16
The cost structure:
A worker who moves to a new firm at the end of period t has to incur the moving cost
of cM . In reality, some components of these costs are paid at time t, while others are
paid in period t+1. Typically, costs that are incurred at time t+1 are transaction and
non-monetary costs associated with reconstructing social capital in a new workplace
and family environment. For ease of exposition, we assume that all the costs are
incurred at t + 1. This assumption has no impact on the conclusions derived here.
At any point in time a non-participant individual may search for a job at a cost γ1
per period, assumed to be strictly lower than cM , paid at the beginning of the next
period. While the assumption that γ1 < cM is not testable, it is reasonable to assume
that moving to a new firm entails higher costs than getting a job while unemployed.
After all, a working individual has to first quit his/her current job, and then has to
15Our model (and the data) does not allow us to distinguish between layoffs and resignations.
Thus, a more appropriate reference to use is separation.
16One can also account for the costs associated with searching for an outside wage offer, but the
main theoretical results remain unchanged. There are a number of equilibrium search models (in
continuous time) with costly on-the-job search and outside job offers in the literature, e.g. Bontemps,
Robin and Van den Berg (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Nagypal (2005) shows that such
models do not generally match the extent of job-to-job transitions in observed data. Consequently,
she develops an alternative theoretical framework that has some similarities with our model.
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incur the associated moving costs, which are at least as high as the cost of moving
from unemployment to a new job. Indeed, the literature provides strong support for
this assumption. For example, Hardman and Ioannides (2004) argue that the high
moving costs, both in terms of out-of-pocket costs and the loss of location-specific
social and human capital, explain why there are infrequent moves of individuals.
The optimal behavior:
We assume that hours of work are constant across all jobs, and concentrate only
on the extensive margin of the participation process, yit, where yit = 1 if the ith
individual participates in period t, and yit = 0 otherwise. Each individual maximizes
the discounted present value of the infinite lifetime (intertemporally) separable utility
function given by (omitting the i and j subscripts):
Ut =
∞X
s=t
βs−tEt [u (Cs, ls;xs)] , (6)
Subject to: Ct = zt + w∗t yt − γ1 (1− yt−1)− cMmt−1, (7)
where u(·) is the per-period utility from consumption Ct and leisure lt = 1 − yt,
conditional on the vector of (observed and unobserved) individual characteristics,
xt. The term β denotes the discount factor. The notation Et (·) denotes that the
expectation is taken conditional on the information available at time t. The budget
constraint assumes neither borrowing nor lending. The price of consumption in each
period is normalized to 1. The quantity zt is non-labor income, w∗t is the individual’s
wage offer,mt = 1 if the individual changes jobs at the end of t, andmt = 0 otherwise.
By virtue of Bellman’s optimality principle, the value function at the beginning
of period t, given participation yt−1 and mobility mt−1 in period t− 1, is
Vt (yt−1,mt−1;xt) = max
yt,mt
{u (Ct, yt;xt) + βEt [Vt+1 (yt,mt;xt+1)]} . (8)
One can derive more detailed expressions for the value functions in each of the
three possible states at t (i.e., not participating, participating without moving, par-
ticipating and moving). It is then possible to derive the reservation wages (i.e., the
wage threshold values) that determine the decision rules in each of the three situa-
tions.17 For example, the reservation wages for a stayer in period t − 1, w∗11,t and
w∗12,t, denote the wage levels that equate the value function of non-participation with
17We provide this in Appendix A.1.
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those of participation, with and without interfirm mobility, respectively (at t), that
is,
V 0t (1, 0;xt) = V
1
t
¡
1, 0;xt | w∗11,t
¢
= V 2t
¡
1, 0;xt | w∗12,t
¢
.
The superscript k in V kt (yt−1,mt−1;xt) indexes the value functions for non-
participation (k = 0), participation without mobility (k = 1), and participation
with mobility (k = 2). For a stayer at t − 1 the wage w∗13,t denotes the reservation
wage that equates the value function of participation without interfirm mobility in
period t with that of participation with interfirm mobility in period t, namely,18
V 1t
¡
1, 0;xt | w∗13,t
¢
= V 2t
¡
1, 0;xt | w∗13,t
¢
.
Summary of events and decisions:
Given the existence of such reservation wages (see the proof in Appendix A.1) and
their relationships (see Appendix A.2), we provide in Appendix A.3 sufficient condi-
tions under which: (1) interfirm mobility may occur; and (2) the participation and
mobility processes exhibit first-order state dependence. These sufficient conditions
require that the mobility cost, cM , should be sufficiently high relative to γ1 and that
the utility function u be weakly concave. Then, the optimal decisions are as follows:
1. A worker who is not employed in period t − 1 has to pay the search cost, γ1,
at the beginning of period t for receiving a wage offer, wt, at time t (from the wage
offer function defined in (3)—(4)). The individual will accept the wage offer at t if
it is greater or equal to a given threshold value w∗02,t. Otherwise, the individual will
decline the offer and continue to search.
2. An employed worker who changes jobs at the end of period t − 1 pays the mo-
bility cost, cM , at the beginning of period t. At the beginning of period t he/she
receives a wage offer from her new employer comprising a non-random and a random
components. The worker learns about the random component just before the end of
period t, i.e. before his/her next mobility/participation decisions. If the wage offer
is lower than the threshold value w∗22,t, then the worker becomes a non-participant at
the end of period t. If the wage offer is higher than a threshold value w∗23,t, then the
worker accepts this (inside) offer and stays at the firm for at least one more period. If
the wage offer falls between w∗22,t and w∗23,t (w∗22,t < w∗23,t), then the optimal strategy
is to move to another firm at the end of period t.
18These reservation wages and all other reservation wages are also explained in greater detail in
Appendix A.1.
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3. An employed worker who decided to stay in the same firm at the end of period
t − 1 also receives a wage offer from his/her current employer in period t (with the
same timing as just above). If the offer is lower than the threshold value w∗12,t, then
the worker becomes a non-participant at the end of period t. If the wage offer is
higher than the reservation wage w∗13,t, then the optimal strategy for this worker is
to accept this (inside) offer and stay at the firm for at least one more period. If this
offer falls between w∗12,t and w∗13,t (w∗12,t < w∗13,t), then the optimal strategy is to move
to another firm at the end of period t (i.e., the worker becomes a mover in period t).
Given the structure of the model and the timing of the events we obtain the
structure for the participation and mobility decisions. We state it formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Under the sufficient conditions given in Appendix A, the wage func-
tion specification in (3), and its error term in (4), the theoretical model implies the
following structure for the participation and interfirm mobility (omitting the ith in-
dex):
yt = 1
£
a0JWjt + x
0
ytβ0 + βy yt−1 + βm yt−1 mt−1 + αy + ut > 0
¤
and (9)
mt = 1
£
a1JWjt + x
0
mtλ0 + λm yt−1 mt−1 + αm + vt > 0
¤ · 1(yt−1 = 1, yt = 1),(10)
where (i) yt and mt are the indicator variables indicating participation and interfirm
mobility at date t, respectively; (ii) JWjt is the summary statistic for the individual’s
work history at date t specified in (5) ( j being the last occupied job); (iii) xyt and
xmt are sets of observable covariates; (iv) αy and αm are person-specific effects and
(v) ut and vt are contemporaneous white noises.
Proof: A complete proof is provided in Appendix A.
The presence of the JWjt in the wage function is crucial for determining interfirm
mobility. A large enough positive change in JWjt would induce a worker to move in
order to “boost” his/her career even though the worker needs to pay the mobility cost
cM . However, some workers with a very negative idiosyncratic shock ξijt may not be
able to cover this mobility cost. In this case, because the search cost γ1 is lower than
cM , the worker may choose to be non-employed, search for a new job and, hopefully,
move to a new firm in the next period. The presence of experience, seniority, and the
JWjt function in the wage function introduces elements of non-stationarity. Clearly,
this model generates endogenous mobility and, therefore, stands in stark contrast
with models of on-the-job search in which job offers or job destructions take place at
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some exogenously given Poisson rate.
Equations (9) and (10) are the reduced-form of our structural model and are
therefore robust to some changes in the maintained hypotheses of the underlying
model, including the exact timing of the events described above. To see this, compare
our model with the standard on-the-job search models, such as Burdett (1978) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In these types of stationary models, that are also
often in continuous time, a worker observes the complete wage offer as soon as the
offer is posted. Nevertheless, their solutions imply that mobility is decided based
on comparing different reservation wages, and thus their reduced-form counterparts
are similar to ours. The model introduced here departs from the traditional on-
the-job search models in that it incorporates some more realistic features of wage
contracts, namely contracts that have both deterministic and random components. It
is important to note though that even if ξijt was known at the beginning of the period,
as in these models, the reduced-form equations would barely change. However, the
solution to the optimal decisions would be a lot more complex, involving differences
between the random terms ξijt and ξij0t, without changing the main results in any
meaningful way.
Finally, technical comments are in order. First, as is discussed in detail below we
impose some exclusion restrictions for identification, i.e., some of the covariates in
xyt and xmt are excluded from xwt, the regressor vector of the wage function in (3).
Second, note that the first-order state dependence on lagged participation and lagged
mobility are captured by the parameters βy, βm in (9) and λm in (10). Finally, note
that the person-specific effects, (i.e., αy, αm from (9) and (10), respectively, and αw
from (13) below), are correlated by construction (see Appendix A for details).
4 Econometric Specification and Estimation
4.1 Econometric Specification
Before proceeding with the econometric specification, it is convenient to rewrite the
model as follows:
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The participation (employment) equation, at any date t > 1, is given by19
yit = 1(y∗it ≥ 0), (11)
y∗it = a0J
W
ijt + x
0
yitβ0 + βyyi,t−1 + βmmi,t−1 + αyi + uit.
The interfirm mobility equation, at any date t > 1, is given by20
mit = 1(m∗it ≥ 0) · 1(yi,t−1 = 1, yit = 1),
m∗it = a1J
W
ijt + x
0
mitλ0 + λmmi,t−1 + αmi + vit. (12)
The wage equation, for any date t, is given by:
wijt = w∗ijt · 1(yit = 1), where (13)
w∗ijt = x
0
witδ0 + J
W
ijt + αwi + ξijt.
The terms y∗it and m∗it denote the two latent variables affecting the employment and
mobility decisions, respectively. Note that an obvious implication of the definition of
a move is that a worker cannot move at date t unless he/she participated at both
t− 1 and t.
Controlling for initial condition is crucial since not all individuals in the sample
are at the same stage in their life cycle. Following Heckman (1981), we approximate
the initial condition using a probit specification given by
yi1 = 1(y∗i1 ≥ 0), where y∗i1 = axyi1 + δyαyi + ui1, and (14)
mi1 = 1(m∗i1 ≥ 0) · 1(yi1 = 1), where m∗i1 = bxmi1 + δmαmi + vi1,
and where αyi and αmi are the individual specific effects in the participation and
mobility equations defined in (11) and (12), respectively. That is, δy and δm are
allowed to differ from 1.
We assume that the individual specific effects are stochastically independent of
the idiosyncratic shocks, that is αi ⊥ (uit, vit, ξijt). Furthermore, αi follows the dis-
19Note that the labor market experience is simply the sum of the individual sequence of yit. As is
common in the literature, we make no distinction in this specification between unemployment and
non-participation in the labor force. In addition, as mentioned earlier, we equate participation and
being employed.
20Mobility takes place at the beginning of period t. Seniority is the sum of the individual sequence
of mit with his/her current employer.
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tribution given by
αi ∼ N(f (xi1, ..., xiT ) ,Γi), where (15)
Γi = Di∆ρDi, Di = diag (σyi, σmi, σwi) , and
{∆ρ}j,l = ραjiαli , for j, l = y,m,w.
where the function f (xi1, ..., xiT ) depends, in principle, on all of the exogenous vari-
ables in all of the periods. We also allow for σji to be heteroskedastic, i.e., to depend
on xyit, xmit and xwit, respectively. That is,
σ2li = exp (hl (xi1, ..., xiT )) , for l = y,m,w, (16)
where each hl(·) is a real valued function. Since the ultimate goal is to control for
the possible existence of heterogeneity in a parsimonious way, we base our estimation
only on a constant term and the first three principle components of the sample av-
erages of the regressors’ vector, i.e., xli = (
PT
t=1 xlit)/T . That is, we approximated
hl (xi1, ..., xiT ) by bhl(xji1, ..., xjiT ) = pc0ibγl, where pci is the vector containing the first
three principal components. This significantly reduces the computational burden.21
Finally, the idiosyncratic error components from (11), (12) and (13), i.e., τ it =
(uit, vit, ξijt)0, are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated white noises, with
τ it ∼ N(0,Σ), where (17)
Σ =
⎛
⎜⎝
1 ρuv ρuξσξ
ρuv 1 ρvξσξ
ρuξσξ ρvξσξ σ2ξ
⎞
⎟⎠ , (18)
and the variances of uit and vit are normalized to σ2u = σ2v = 1 for identification
purposes.
In the analysis reported below, we adopt a Bayesian approach whereby we obtain
the conditional posterior distribution of the parameters, conditional on the data, using
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods as explained below.22
21The first three principle components account for over 98% of the total variance of xji, so that
there is almost no loss of information by doing so. Also, note that bγj , j = y,m,w, have no
causal interpretation. We use this structure to control merely for possible heteroskedasticity of the
covariance matrix.
22One can also use an alternative (frequentist) approach such as Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML) (e.g. Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996), McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989)).
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4.2 Computation of The Posterior Distribution
Since it is analytically intractable to compute the exact posterior distribution of the
model’s parameters, conditional on the observed data, our goal here is to summarize
the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of the model using a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.23
Let the prior density of the model’s parameters be denoted by π(θ), where θ
contains all of the parameters of the model as defined in detail below. The posterior
distribution of the parameters would then be π(θ | z) ∝ Pr(z | θ)π(θ), where z denotes
the observed data. This posterior density cannot be easily simulated due to the
intractability of Pr(z | θ). Hence, we follow Chib and Greenberg (1998) and augment
the parameter space to include the vector of the latent variables, z∗it = (y∗it,m∗it, w∗ijt),
where y∗it, m∗it and w∗ijt are defined in (11), (12) and (13), respectively. With this
addition, it is easier to implement the Gibbs sampler, which iterates through the
set of the conditional distributions of z∗ (conditional on θ) and θ (conditional on
z∗).24 For the simulation results reported below, we use 50,000 MCMC repetitions
after discarding the first 5,000. We use Gelfand and Smith (1990) to assess the
performance of the algorithm.
For the prior distributions of the model’s parameters we use conjugate priors. In
each of the cases, we used proper, but very diffuse priors, to ensure that the posterior
distributions are indeed proper distributions. An extensive sensitivity analysis carried
out shows that the choice of the particular prior distribution has hardly any effect
on the posterior distribution. In particular, we estimate the model centering the
key parameters around the results obtained by Topel (1991) and AS. The resulting
posterior distributions obtained under both scenarios were virtually identical.
However, the maximization is rather complicated and highly time consuming. For comparison, we
estimated the model using the SML method only for one group (the smallest one) of college gradu-
ates. The estimation took several months. Nevertheless, the point estimates for all of the model’s
parameters obtained by the SML were virtually the same as the mean of the joint posterior distri-
bution of the model’s parameter, inducing identical estimates for the main parameters of interest,
namely the returns to seniority and experience. The MCMC method can be viewed in this sense as
a mechanical device for obtaining SML estimates.
23Appendix B provides a detailed description of the implementation of the MCMC simulation.
24A presentation of the theory and practice of Gibbs sampling and MCMC methods may be found
in Robert and Casella (1999) and Chib (2001). In econometrics, recent applications to panel data
include Geweke and Keane (2000), Chib and Hamilton (2002) and Fougère and Kamionka (2003).
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4.3 Exclusion Restrictions and Identification
It is worthwhile to note that models such as the one specified above depend on
the functional form restrictions (e.g. Chamberlain (1984)). Thus, the robustness of
the results depends on the particular situation. Hyslop (1999) discusses the potential
problems and identifying restrictions one needs to impose in a similar situation. Here,
the identification of state dependence depends on having time varying regressors. As
Hyslop (1999) correctly notes, any transitory changes in the relevant regressors (i.e.,
xyit in (11) and xmit in (12)) will have persistent effects on the probabilities through
their effect on yit and mit, respectively. If the only source of dynamics in the model
stems from the first-order state dependence, then the participation probability, i.e.,
Pr
¡
yit = 1|yi,t−1mi,t−1, JWijt, xyit, αyi
¢
, does not depend on the lagged x’s , and similarly
for the mobility probability. However, any form of serial correlation in the error
terms will induce dependence of these probabilities on lagged x’s. Our specification
assumes that the idiosyncratic term, τ it, in (17) is serially uncorrelated,. but some
correlation over time does exist because of the presence of the individual specific
random component vector αi given in (15).25
As we discuss in the results section below we impose some exclusion restrictions;
that is, some of variables that appear in these equations do not appear in the wage
function. These exclusion restrictions provide an additional source of identification
beyond that implied by the particular functional form imposed. Our framework allows
us to directly test these identifying exogeneity restrictions.
Consider the linear regressions αji = z0iδ
A
j + uαji, for j = y,m,w, where
z0i = (z0i1, ..., z0iT ), and zit is a vector containing the potentially exogenous variables
for individual i at time t. If zit is indeed exogenous with respect to both the partici-
pation and mobility, then it should be uncorrelated with the unobserved individuals
component, αi. Hence, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is first specified as
HA0 : δ
A
j = 0, for j = y,m,w. (19)
To test this hypothesis we compute the mean of the posterior distribution for the
individuals’ specific parameters, say α1, ..., αn, and regress each component of αi,
(i.e., αyi, αmi, and αwi) on zi to obtain the estimates for δ
A
j , say
bδAj , for j = y,m,w.
25An additional problem with discrete choice models is that in order to observe changes in the
binary outcome variables, yi,t and mi,t, from one period to another, there need to be sufficiently
large changes in the underlying latent variables, y∗i,t and m
∗
i,t.
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We then conduct Wald tests for the joint significance of the coefficients in bδAj .
In addition, we also consider the regressions αji = x0−ziη + z
0
iδ
B
j + uαji, for j =
y,m,w,where x−zi is the vector of all variables in all periods for individual i, excluding
the variables in zi. Again, we regress each of the components of αi on the regressor
vectors zi and x−zi and test for
HB0 : δ
B
j = 0, for j = y,m,w. (20)
5 The Data
Following Topel (1991) and AWwe used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
survey. The PSID is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of individuals in
the U.S. and the family units in which they reside. The survey, begun in 1968, em-
phasizes the dynamic aspects of economic and demographic behavior, but its content
is broad, including sociological and psychological measures.
Two key features give the PSID its unique analytic power: (i) individuals are fol-
lowed over very long time periods in the context of their family setting and (ii) the fam-
ilies are tracked across generations, where interviews of multiple generations within
the same families are often conducted simultaneously. Starting with a national sam-
ple of 5,000 U.S. households in 1968, the PSID has re-interviewed individuals from
these households every year, whether or not they were living in the same dwelling or
with the same people. While there was some attrition, the PSID has had significant
success in its re-contact efforts.26
The data extract used in this study comes from the 18 waves of the PSID from
1975 to 1992. The sample is restricted to all heads of households interviewed for
at least three years during the sample period and who are between the ages of 18
and 65. We use all of the individuals, including self-employed. We carry out some
sensitivity analyses and exclude the self-employed from our sample, but the results
remain virtually unchanged. Also, since most of the heads of the households in the
sample are men, we conduct an additional analysis dropping the women household
heads from the estimation. Again, no visible differences have been detected in the
results obtained. We do exclude from the analysis all observations from the poverty
sub-sample of the PSID.
26For a more detailed description of the PSID, see Hill (1992).
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There are some difficulties with some of the key variables of our analysis and
especially with the tenure variable. As noted by Topel (1991), tenure on a job is
often recorded in wide intervals, and a large number of observations are lost because
tenure is missing. There is also a large number of inconsistencies in the data causing
tremendous spurious year-to-year variance in reported tenure on a given job. For
example, between two years of a single job, tenure sometimes fell (or rose) by more
than one year. There are many years with missing tenure followed by years in which
a respondent reported more than 20 years of seniority.
Since these errors can basically determine the outcome of the analysis, we recon-
struct the tenure and experience variables using the exact procedure suggested by
Topel (1991). Specifically, for jobs that begin in the panel, tenure was started at zero
and incremented by one for each additional year in which the person worked for the
same employer. For jobs that began before the first year that a person is in the sam-
ple, a different procedure was followed. In such cases, the starting tenure is inferred
from the longest sequence of consistent observations. If no such sequence exists, then
we begin from the maximum tenure on the job, provided that the maximum is less
than the age of the person minus his/her education minus 6. If this is not the case,
then we begin from the second largest value of recorded tenure. Once the starting
point has been determined, tenure is incremented by one for each additional year with
the same employer. Similar principles have been also employed for determining initial
experience. Once the starting point has been computed, experience is incremented by
one for each year in which the person works. Using this procedure, we have managed
to eliminate all inconsistencies.27
Summary statistics of some of the key variables in the extract used here are
reported in Table 1. Note that due to the nature of the PSID data collection strategy,
the average age does not increase much over time. The average education rises by
more than half a year between 1975 and 1992 because the new individuals entering
the sample tend to have a higher level of education than those interviewed in the
past. Also, experience and seniority increase over the sample from 20.8 and 5.2 years
in 1975 to 24.2 and 7.3 years in 1992, respectively.
The experience variable reported in our study seems to be very much in line with
27We have also taken a few other additional cautionary measures. For example, we check that:
(i) the reported unemployment matched the change in the seniority level; and (ii) no peculiar changes
in the reported state of residence and region of residence exist, etc. The programs are available from
the corresponding author upon request.
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the experience levels reported in other studies. However, there is a substantial dif-
ference between the tenure variable used here and that used by Topel and especially
AW (see AW, Table 1). The main reason for this discrepancy is the fact that we
restrict the sample to individuals for whom we have consistent data for three con-
secutive years. Individuals with lower seniority are also those who tend to leave the
PSID sample more frequently. Nevertheless, we provide strong evidence below that
the differences in the results are not due to the use of different data extracts, but
rather due to the differences in the modeling and estimation approaches.
The mobility variable indicates that, in each of the sample years, between 6.5%
and 14.1% of the individuals change jobs. The mobility of 23.4% in the first year of
the sample is largely due to measurement error. This is precisely the reason why it
is necessary to control for initial conditions as is explained above.
Consistent with other data sources, the average real wages increased slightly over
the sample years. This increase is mainly caused by individuals entering the sample
whose wages increased over time in real terms, while those who left the sample had
wages that decreased somewhat over the sample years. More importantly, as has
been documented in the literature, the wage dispersion has increased across years.
Also, consistent with other data sources, the participation rate of the individuals in
the sample (almost exclusively men) decreases steadily over the sample years from
about 94% in 1975 to 86% in 1992. The PSID over-sampled non-white individuals.
However, since the results change very little when we use a representative sample
of non-white individuals, we have included all individuals satisfying the conditions
described above.
The data reflect the general finding in the literature about the changing structure
of the typical American family. The fraction of married individuals declined signif-
icantly over the sample period, as did the total number of children in the family.
Consequently, the fraction of individuals having young children also declined over the
sample years.
Note that there are also substantial changes in the distribution of cohorts during
the sample period. While the fraction of individuals in the youngest cohort increased
steadily, the fraction of individuals in the older cohorts decreased over the sample
period. We also observe some changes in the age and race structure. All these
changes are largely due to the strong geographic mobility of the younger workers that
the PSID has lost contact with.
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6 The Results
Below, we present a set of results covering various aspects of the model. After dis-
cussing the specifications we highlight the sources for identification of the model’s
parameters. After a brief discussion of the results for the participation and mobility
we concentrate our discussion on the returns to human capital, namely education, ex-
perience, and the returns to seniority, the key element of this study. We then present
an in depth discussion of the implications of the results, as well as a comparison to
previous literature.
6.1 Specifications and Sources of Identification
The estimation is carried out for three separate education groups. The first group
includes all of the individuals with less than 12 years of education, referred to as
high school (HS) dropouts. The second group consists of those who are high school
graduates, but have not completed a four-year college degree. We refer to this group
as high school graduates. The third group, the college graduates, consists of those
individuals with at least 16 years of education and who have earned a college degree.
The participation equation includes the following variables: a constant, education,
quartic in lagged labor market experience, a set of three regional dummy variables, a
dummy variable for residence in an SMSA, family unearned income, dummy variables
for being African American and Hispanic, county of residence unemployment rate, a
set of variables providing information about the children in the family, a dummy
variable for being married, a set of four dummy variables for the cohort of birth and a
full set of year indicators. We also include the JW function, as explained in Section 3.
The mobility equation includes the same variables as the participation equation, and,
in addition, a quartic polynomial in lagged seniority on the current job and a set of
nine industry indicator variables.
The dependent variable in the wage equation is the log of the deflated annual wage.
The set of regressors in the wage function is the same as in the mobility equation,
with two key differences. First, the quartic polynomials in the wage equation are
in current (rather than lagged) experience and seniority. Second, as discussed in
Section 4.3, we impose a number of exclusion restrictions on the wage function. The
excluded variables are: family unearned income, the number of children in the family,
the number of children between one and two, the number of children between three
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and five, and the marital status dummy variable, all of which appear in both the
participation and mobility equations.28
It is worthwhile to note that the identification of the model’s parameters comes
from both the cross-sectional and the time-series dimensions. If there were no indi-
vidual specific effects the cross-sectional dimension would provide enough variation
for us to estimate all the model’s parameters, although one might rightly question
the quality of the estimate for the return to experience and, especially, the return
to tenure. The time-series dimension helps identify these last two key parameters.
This comes from the fact that there are many individuals who changed jobs during
the sample period, and did so at different points of their life-cycle. The time-series
dimension also allows us to control for the individual specific effects. This is why we
restrict the data extract to include only individuals who were observed for at least
three consecutive years. Since experience and seniority are fully endogenized, we need
not impose any further restrictions on the data extract (e.g. restricting attention to
only exogenously displaced workers) as is done in Dustmann and Meghir (2005) or
Topel (1991).
The main results are provided in Tables 2 through 9. It turns out that the marginal
distributions of all the model’s parameters, as well as all the marginal and cumulative
returns to experience and seniority, are very close to those of normal random variables.
Thus, it is sufficient to report the mean and standard deviation of the marginal
posterior distribution for each of the parameters. For brevity we present in the tables
only the results regarding the key variables in the analysis.
6.2 Participation and Mobility
The results for the participation and mobility decisions are presented in Tables 2
and 3, respectively. As explained above, in both the participation and mobility equa-
tions we account for duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. As is implied
by our model, the participation equation includes lagged participation and lagged mo-
bility, whereas the mobility equation only includes lagged mobility. In principle, one
also needs to include the JW function from (5) in both the employment and mobility
equations; however, doing so does not change the results in any meaningful way. First,
all of the coefficients associated with the elements of the JW function are statistically
28Hyslop (1999), Mroz (1987), among others, provided very strong evidence that these variables
are indeed exogenous, at least with respect to the participation decision.
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and economically insignificant. Moreover, the inclusion of the JW function has no
effect on any of the other parameter estimates. Hence, we exclude the JW function
from both the participation and mobility equations.
Participation (Table 2):
The estimates of the parameters from the participation equation are in line with those
previously obtained in the literature and consistent with the classic human capital
theory. Education is an important factor in the participation decision for the more
educated individuals, but seem to play no role for the high school dropouts. Similarly,
experience is more important for the more educated individuals as well.
Note that lagged employment has a positive and highly significant effect for all
three education groups. Individuals who participate in one period are also likely to
participate in the following period, regardless of their education level. The positive
and significant coefficient on laggedmobility indicate that worker who changes jobs are
more likely to participate in the labor force in the following period, and, as predicted
by human capital theory, this effect is stronger for the least educated individuals.
The results for the family variables are, in general, consistent with economic the-
ory, especially regarding the marital status and the children variables. The race effect
is particularly striking. African-Americans are less likely to participate, relative to
their white counterparts, while for Hispanics this appear to be the case only for college
graduates.
Mobility (Table 3):
One important finding is that the more senior workers are a lot less likely to move.
This is largely because once a person leaves a job the accumulated returns to seniority
(representing firm-specific human capital) are lost . Moreover, a move in one period
significantly reduces the probability of a move in the subsequent period, and more
so for the more educated individuals. This may simply mean that more educated
individuals are more likely to be in jobs that are better matches, or, alternatively it
may be that the signalling effect of repeated frequent moves are more severe for the
more educated individuals.
Note that experience does not seem to have as strong an effect as that of seniority.
Nevertheless, consistent with the general findings in the literature (e.g. Farber (1999))
the results suggest that more experienced workers tend to move less. In turn, the
results suggest that one needs to account for the endogeneity of experience, not only
seniority, when estimating a wage function. Interestingly, the only family variable
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that seems to affect mobility is family unearned income. As it turns out, the marginal
effect of unearned family income on the probability of a move, when evaluated at the
group mean, is roughly the same for all groups. Finally, race does not seem to play a
major role in mobility decisions, except maybe for the most highly educated African-
American.
6.3 The Wage Function and the Returns to Human Capital
The Returns to Education:
The results for the returns to education are reported in Table 4. The (within-
education groups) returns to education are broadly consistent with the human capital
theory of Becker (1964). Declining marginal returns to education lead to lower mar-
ginal returns to education for the college graduates than for the high school graduates.
However, the marginal returns for the high school graduates, 4.8%, are larger than
for the high school dropouts, only 2.5%. These results appear to be consistent with,
although somewhat lower than, recent findings in the literature (e.g. Card (2001)).29
Once one controls for the selection effects, due to the participation and mobility deci-
sions, the estimated returns to education are reduced somewhat. This also seems to
provide a plausible explanation for the fact that the returns to education are larger
for the high school graduates and college graduates than for high school dropouts.
We return to this issue below when discussing the estimates of the stochastic terms
of the model.
The Returns to Experience:
In Table 5 we provide estimates for the returns to experience, which are based
on the parameter estimates reported in Table 4. The results are close, yet generally
larger, than those previously reported in the literature. Topel reports an estimate (see
Tables 1 and 2 of Topel (1991)) of the cumulative returns to experience at 10 years
of experience of .354. The estimates of AS at this level of experience range between
.372 and .442, while those of AW range between .310 and .374. Our estimates are
.362 for the high school dropouts, .402 for the high school graduates and .661 for the
college graduates. Our results indicate that there are substantial differences across
the various education groups at all levels of experience. For example, five years after
29There is substantial variation in years of education within each group of education as we defined
them. This variation allowed us to separately identify the within-group returns to education for
each of the three groups.
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entering the labor market, the cumulative returns for college graduates are almost
twice as large as those for the other two groups.
To examine the sensitivity of the results we consider several alternative model’s
specifications.30 First we estimate the model using a quadratic, rather than the
quartic, polynomial in experience and mobility. The estimated cumulative returns to
experience for this model are substantially lower than those reported in Table 5. For
example, the cumulative returns at 10 years of experience are .246, .253 and .446 for
the three education groups, respectively.
Next we examine the effect of controlling for past labor market history. To do that
we re-estimate the two models discussed above with the JW function excluded. Omit-
ting the JW function induces a large increase in the estimated cumulative returns to
experience for all education groups. Given that the estimates of the parameters asso-
ciated with the JW function (see rows 11—23 of Table 4) are jointly highly significant,
highlights the importance of controlling for past job market history. As the results
clearly indicate, failing to account for past changes in employment status and job mo-
bility induces a severe upward bias on the estimated returns to experience. Moreover,
in our study we control for the possible correlations between the various individual-
specific effects in the estimated equation. It turns out that failure to control for these
correlations induces downward biased on the estimated returns to experience. After
controlling for these two effects, the estimate we obtain are somewhat larger than
those previously found by Topel (1991), AS, and AW.
The Returns to Seniority:
The returns to seniority are reported in Table 6 and are based on the parameter
estimates reported in Table 4. The estimated returns to seniority, at all levels of
seniority and for all education groups, are significantly higher than those previously
reported in the literature, including those reported by Topel (1991). In fact, the
support of the marginal posterior distributions for the returns to seniority is entirely
in the positive segment of the real line for all groups. Also notable is the fact that the
returns also increase dramatically with the level of seniority. For example, while at
two years of seniority the cumulative returns are around 13% for the three education
groups , they rise to about 50% at ten years of seniority. The results for the quadratic
model, not reported here, are qualitatively similar to those reported here for the
quartic model. One noticeable difference is that the cumulative return to seniority
30For brevity, we do not report these results in a form of a table, but they are available from the
authors upon request.
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for the least educated group flattens at ten years of seniority.
When the JW function is excluded from the wage equation the resulting estimates
of the returns to seniority, for both the quartic and the quadratic models, are signifi-
cantly lower. Again, this clearly illustrates the need for one to account for past labor
market history, as we do via the JW function. When one does not include the JW
function, the average cumulative returns for the three education groups are, as one
might expect, remarkably close to those obtained by Topel.
One key reason for the difference between our results and those of Topel (1991) is
that Topel assumes that level of experience at a new job is exogenous. The literature
(e.g. Farber (1999)) and the results presented here provide strong evidence that this
far from being true. In fact, individuals with low experience tend to change jobs
more frequently. Indeed, when we treat experience as exogenous and eliminate the
participation equation from the estimation, the resulting returns to experience are
significantly reduced and are comparable to those obtained by Topel. The returns
to seniority obtained remain still significantly higher than those obtained by Topel.
Moreover, when we omit the JW function from the wage equation, the resulting
estimates for the returns to seniority are reduced even further. Nevertheless, they are
still larger than those of Topel, largely because he does not account for the possible
unobserved heterogeneity in the way we do.
The results for cumulative returns to experience and seniority indicate that the
sum of the returns from experience and seniority are quite similar across the various
specifications (i.e., quartic versus quadratic, and with and without the JW function),
but larger than previously obtained in the literature. The correlation coefficients
between experience and seniority in our data extract are .22, .36, and .46, for the high
school dropouts, high school graduates and college graduates, respectively. Thus, it is
not surprising to find that larger returns to one component are associated with lower
returns to the other. Specifically, our results suggest that accounting for endogeneity
of experience is crucial in correctly assessing the effect of tenure, and more so for the
more educated individuals.
To contrast our results with those previously found in the literature, we provide in
Table 7 a comparison with AW results. In Panel A of the table we present the results
of AW (their Table 2). The results in that panel are based on AW’s methodology ap-
plied to the Topel replication sample for the period 1968-1983. In Panel B we present
the results for the high school dropouts and the second for college graduates, based
on AW’s methodology and our model, using our sample for the period 1975-1992.
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The OLS estimates for the returns to seniority for the two alternative samples are
remarkably close, as are the IV estimates for the two samples. The conclusion is thus
very clear: the apparent differences in results in our study stem from differences in
methodology, not in the data extract. In fact, the most important elements that ex-
plain these differences are: (a) endogenizing the participation decision; (b) the explicit
control for individual-specific effects in the three equations; and (c) the introduction
of the JW function that captures past employment spells.
6.4 Testing for the Exclusion Restrictions
The results of the testing procedure described in Section 4.3 are provided in Table 8
for two alternatives, namely the quartic and quadratic models (both including the
JW function). The results in the columns that are marked HA0 and HB0 refer to the
test described in (19) and (20), respectively.
Note that in all cases but one we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that
the set of coefficients corresponding to the excluded variables are zero. Even in
the single case where we do reject the null hypothesis, the p-value is quite large,
.087. These results lend strong support to the validity of the identifying assumptions
described in Section 4.1. There are some differences, as one might expect, between
the results obtained for the individual specific effect for the wage equation, αw, and
the participation and mobility equations, αy and αm. Specifically, it is easier to reject
the null hypothesis for αw than for either αy or αm.
6.5 The JW Function
As explained above, the JW function is an individual-job specific function that par-
simoniously summarizes the changes in one’s wage that correspond to a particular
career path, providing a measure of the individual’s opportunity wage at any point
in his/her career. The parameter estimates of the JW function, provided in rows 11
through 23 of Table 4, clearly indicate the importance of controlling for an individ-
ual’s career path. While some of the individual parameter estimates are statistically
insignificant, the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zeros is rejected at any rea-
sonable significance level for all of the three education groups.
Some important implications emerge from these results. First, the timing of a
move in a worker’s career matters. While, at the time of a move, a person loses
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the accumulated returns to seniority, he/she also receives a premium. This premium
corresponds to the particular levels of experience and seniority at the previous job,
and includes: (a) a fixed increase determine by the length of spell on the previous
job (φj0, j = 1, ..., 4); (b) a variable change proportional to seniority at the time of
the job change (φsj, j = 2, 3, 4); and (c) variable, career effect, change proportional to
experience at the time of the job change (φej, j = 1, ..., 4).
Consider, for example, a high school dropout with 10 years of seniority and 10
years of experience moving to a new job. The results from Table 6 indicate that
he/she would lose .507 in log-wage. However, from Table 4 we see that he/she would
gain .215 (line 15) plus .011× 10 = .11 (line 18) plus .001× 10 = .01 (line 22), for an
overall substantial wage loss of about 17%. This loss captures the so-called displaced
worker effect analyzed in the literature. The effect of unemployment spells during
one’s career is captured through the (actual) labor market experience.
The pattern for the more highly educated individual is quite different. Similar
calculation show that the net effect for a college-educated worker changing jobs after
10 years of seniority and 10 years of experience is a 8% reduction in his/her wage. In
contrast, the net gain for a college-educated worker at the beginning of his/her career
changing jobs having 2 years of seniority and 2 years of experience is almost 12%.
Note it is possible to estimate the JW function because we explicitly endogenize
both experience and seniority. In turn, the introduction of JW allows us to control
for the indirect effects of experience and seniority that stem from the individual’s
specific work history. Consistent with the results of Topel and Ward (1992), we find
that this non-linear interaction between seniority and experience plays a crucial role in
explaining wage growth, particularly at the beginning of one’s career, as is illustrated
below.
6.6 Estimates of the Stochastic Elements
In Table 9, we provide estimates of the key parameters associated with the stochas-
tic elements of the model, that is, the parameters of Σ in (18) and the correlation
parameters of ∆ρ in (15). Since Σ and ∆ρ are left largely unrestricted, the results
allow us to empirically assess the need to control for the participation and mobility
decisions when estimating the wage equation.
Note that correlations between the various person-specific components, i.e., the
elements of ∆ρ, are highly significant and very large in magnitude. This is especially
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true for the high school graduates and college graduates. Since higher participation
rates imply faster accumulation of labor market experience, the estimates of ραyαw
imply that, all other things being equal, high-wage workers (i.e., those with a large
αw) tend also to be more experienced workers. Hence, omission of αw from the wage
equation would induce an upward bias in the estimated returns to experience. In
contrast, the positive correlation between αy and αm implies that failing to control
for the participation decision would induce a downward bias on the estimates of
returns to experience. While the net effect of these two conflicting effects is a priori
not clear, we find that they almost cancel each other, leading to estimated returns
to experience which are only somewhat larger than those previously obtained in the
literature (e.g. Topel (1991), AS and AW).
The correlations between the participation and mobility components, i.e., ραyαm
and between the mobility and wage components, i.e., ραmαw , are very large and neg-
ative for the high school graduates and college graduates. That is, high-mobility
workers also tend to be low-wage and low-participation workers. Moreover, since
high-wage workers have higher seniority than low-wage workers, omitting αw from
the wage equation would induce an upward bias in the estimated returns to seniority.
On the other hand, because ραmαw < 0, failing to control for the mobility decision
would induce a downward bias in the returns to seniority. Empirically we find that
the net effect–once we control for the mobility and participation decisions, the unob-
served heterogeneity, and introduce the JW function–is huge, leading to estimated
returns to seniority which are larger than those estimated by Topel (1991).
Finally, examining the estimated Σ, we see that ρuξ, the correlation between the
idiosyncratic errors in the participation and wage equations, is negative and highly
significant for all of the education groups. In contrast, and mostly for the college-
educated workers, positive shocks to mobility are associated with positive shocks to
wages.
6.7 Implications for Long-run Wage Growth
The complexity of the model and the implied interactions between the various com-
ponents makes it difficult to evaluate the overall effects of participation and mobility
episodes on wage growth. In order to more closely examine this issue, we follow the
wage growth for two types of hypothetical workers with two distinct career paths.
One group consists of individuals working through the entire sample period in one
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job, while the other includes those working at one firm for the first four years, then
changing to a new job in which they stay for the remainder of the sample period.
For both groups we focus our attention on new entrants (with 5 years of experience
and 2 years of tenure) and experienced workers (with 15 years of experience and 6
years of tenure.) The results for the high school graduates and college graduates are
presented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.31 In all of the figures we decompose the
wage growth that stems from returns to human capital into the part due to rising
experience and the part due to rising seniority. In doing so we also account for all
the terms associated with the JW function, which come into play when an individual
changes jobs.
First, consistent with the theory of human capital, wage growth early in one’s
career is large, and more significant for the more educated individuals. This effect is
further reinforced when one takes into account the effect implied by the JW function.
For example, wage growth over the 18-year period for new entrants with a high school
degree (Figure 1a) is .74 log points, whereas for new entrants with a college degree it
is .94 log points (Figure 2a). This is in addition to the fact that college graduates also
start a a higher level. Furthermore, wage growth that stems from increased seniority
is larger than wage growth that stems from increased experience. For the college
graduates with no job changes (Figure 2a and 2b) the increases due to seniority and
experience are .59 and .35 log points, respectively, for the new entrants, and .50 and
−.08, for the experienced workers. The differences for the high school graduates with
no job changes (Figures 1a and 1b) are .59 and .16 log points, respectively, for the
new entrants, while for the experienced workers, the respective increases are .48 and
−.04 log points. The results indicate that the decreases in wages associated with
the loss of firm-specific skills, as represented by seniority, are quite substantial for all
groups.
These figures illustrate the magnitude of two effects that come into play when a
worker changes jobs. First, there are direct losses due to lost returns to accumulated
seniority. Second, there are discrete jumps, as implied by the JW function, in wages
at the entry level in a new job. Figures 1 and 2 show that labor market histories have
differential effects across the various groups. For example, for high school graduates
with little labor market experience, the loss of accumulated seniority is compensated
almost entirely by a discrete increase in the base wage (Figure 1c). For new entrants
31The results for the high school dropouts are very similar to those of the high school graduates,
and are therefore omitted.
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with a college degree, the loss of accumulated seniority is more than compensated by
the change in the entry wage level (Figure 2c).
In contrast, workers with substantial labor market experience after a relatively
long spell within a firm incur substantial wage loss when changing jobs as is observed
in Figure 1d. The overall loss is approximately .16 log points for the high school
graduate (Figure 1d), while the loss for experienced college graduates a long tenure
spell is somewhat smaller (Figure 2d).
7 Summary and Conclusions
Various theories in economics predict that wage compensation should rise with labor
market experience and seniority (tenure) in the firm. While the empirical literature
finds that experience is indeed important, there is much disagreement about the role
of tenure. In this study we adopt recent methodological advancements that allow us
to take a new, and more insightful, look at this on going debate. We adopt the same
general Mincer’s wage specification as in previous literature. However, in contrast to
virtually all other studies, we explicitly model the participation (employment) and
job mobility decisions, along with the wage equation. That is, we not only take
into account the endogeneity of tenure, but we also take into account the possible
endogeneity that stems from the (endogenous) employment decisions.
The estimated equations are the reduced-form equations derived from a theoret-
ical model. This model builds on Hyslop (1999) and extends his model to include
key features from the job search theory. This approach allows us to re-examine the
magnitude of the returns to seniority in the United States, as well as providing expla-
nations for the apparent differences between our findings and those previously found
in the literature. Specifically, we control for unobserved heterogeneity by introducing
person specific random correlated effects in the three estimated equations. We also
control for the individuals’ job specific labor market histories. This modeling strategy
allows us to trace the implied biases that stem from estimating the wage equation
by itself, or by estimating the wage function only controlling for the endogeneity of
tenure.
The results unequivocally support Topel’s (1991) findings and conjectures. We
find that the returns to seniority are large and highly significant. In fact, the support
of the posterior distribution of the returns to seniority is entirely in the positive
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segment of the real line for all three education groups. Various sensitivity analyses
demonstrate that the distinct results obtained in our study are not an artifact of the
data extract used, but rather stem from our modeling approach. Particularly, our
study clearly demonstrates the importance of jointly estimating the wage equation
along with the employment and mobility decisions.
We also find that in addition to the direct effects that experience and seniority
have on one’s wages, there are indirect effects that depend on the individual’s spe-
cific career path. Because careers differ widely across workers with otherwise similar
backgrounds, it seems crucial to take into account this feature when estimating a
wage equation. Estimation of the model with and without taking into account the
workers’ careers paths (summarized by the newly developed non-linear function JW )
provide quantitatively different results, but the qualitative results remain unchanged.
That is, the consistently large estimates for the returns to tenure stem largely from
the fact that we fully endogenize the employment and mobility decisions, while also
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
Our estimates of the returns to experience are also somewhat larger than those
previously obtained in the literature. However, these findings are not uniform across
all education groups, as they are higher for the college graduates than for the other
two education groups. Also, the pattern of job-to-job mobility, as summarized by the
non-linear function JW , has differential impact on wages at the entry level in new jobs
across the three education groups. In particular, and consistent with the displaced
worker literature, while early job changes are most beneficial to college-educated
workers, late job changes are more detrimental to workers with lower education.
Overall, wage growth is achieved through a combination of wage increases within
the firm and by interfirm mobility. The former is more important for the wage growth
of high school dropouts, because of their lower returns to experience. The latter is
more important for college graduates, both because the returns to seniority are larger
during the first few years in a given job, and because there is no penalty from job-to-
job mobility.
This may not be the last word on this important issue, but this study certainly
sheds new light on a variety of modeling issues leading to the very different find-
ings obtained in this study. Further work on the issue, which includes cross-country
comparisons, are certainly in order and may shed new light on the role of countries’
institutions.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the PSID Extract
for Selected Years and Variables
Variable Year
1975 1984 1992
Education 11.589 12.155 12.108
(3.317) (2.929) (3.308)
Experience 20.808 21.330 24.169
(14.364) (14.148) (12.877)
Seniority 5.152 5.993 7.285
(7.686) (7.142) (7.563)
Participation 0.942 0.881 0.862
(0.233) (0.324) (0.345)
Mobility 0.236 0.087 0.065
(0.424) (0.281) (0.247)
Log Wage 9.869 9.902 9.924
(0.789) (0.877) (0.842)
African American 0.309 0.320 0.254
(0.462) (0.466) (0.435)
Hispanic 0.036 0.034 0.071
(0.186) (0.180) (0.257)
Family unearned income 0.671 2.042 2.960
(1.926) (7.093) (13.438)
No. of children 1.350 1.042 1.107
(1.225) (1.043) (1.166)
Children 1 to 2 0.216 0.210 0.173
(0.325) (0.364) (0.370)
Children 3 to 5 0.225 0.213 0.196
(0.333) (0.368) (0.386)
Married 0.854 0.789 0.777
(0.482) (0.497) (0.499)
Individual’s cohorts by age in 1975:
Age 15 or less 0 0.256 0.516
(0) (0.436) (0.500)
Age 16 to 25 0.218 0.269 0.186
(0.413) (0.443) (0.390)
Age 26 to 35 0.296 0.187 0.124
(0.457) (0.390) (0.329)
Age 36 to 45 0.173 0.105 0.070
(0.378) (0.307) (0.255)
No. of observations 3,385 4,451 5,397
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Table 2: Participation by Education Group
High School High School College
Dropouts Graduates Graduates
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Constant -0.507 0.347 0.185 0.296 -1.245 0.650
Education -0.017 0.015 0.046 0.014 0.130 0.027
Lagged Experience -0.029 0.043 -0.089 0.027 -0.068 0.061
Lagged Exp.2/100 0.180 0.264 0.794 0.191 0.807 0.413
Lagged Exp.3/1, 000 -0.033 0.063 -0.251 0.050 -0.272 0.105
Lagged Exp.4/10, 000 -0.000 0.005 0.022 0.004 0.023 0.009
Lagged Participation 1.723 0.061 1.677 0.051 1.890 0.104
Lagged Mobility 0.654 0.132 0.420 0.076 0.372 0.156
Family Variables:
Family unearned income 0.008 0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.002
No. of Children 0.070 0.025 -0.019 0.022 0.193 0.065
Children 1 to 2 -0.054 0.065 -0.119 0.048 -0.158 0.127
Children 3 to 5 -0.122 0.064 -0.008 0.047 -0.062 0.142
Married 0.184 0.064 0.378 0.058 0.173 0.120
Ethnicity:
African American -0.464 0.094 -0.434 0.076 -0.224 0.173
Hispanic -0.026 0.128 -0.051 0.146 -0.738 0.313
Note: Also included in the regression are a full set of year dummy vari-
ables, four regional location dummy variables, a dummy variable for living in
an SMSA, county of residence unemployment rate, and a set of cohort dummy
variables for the cohorts defined in Table 1.
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Table 3: Mobility by Education Group
High School High School College
Dropouts Graduates Graduates
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Constant -1.201 0.273 -1.293 0.165 -1.248 0.266
Education -0.000 0.011 0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.010
Lagged Experience 0.002 0.030 -0.012 0.014 -0.014 0.027
Lagged Exp.2/100 -0.186 0.207 -0.106 0.115 -0.232 0.211
Lagged Exp.3/1, 000 0.061 0.055 0.048 0.035 0.103 0.064
Lagged Exp.4/10, 000 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.011 0.007
Lagged Seniority -0.113 0.023 -0.161 0.012 -0.149 0.023
Lagged Sen.2/100 0.729 0.306 1.035 0.155 1.133 0.319
Lagged Sen.3/1, 000 -0.215 0.138 -0.291 0.064 -0.393 0.153
Lagged Sen.4/10, 000 0.022 0.020 0.029 0.008 0.048 0.023
Lagged Mobility -0.679 0.069 -0.854 0.037 -1.017 0.062
Family Variables:
Family unearned income -0.034 0.009 -0.027 0.003 -0.010 0.002
No. of Children -0.006 0.015 0.009 0.011 -0.057 0.020
Children 1 to 2 0.063 0.039 0.036 0.021 0.056 0.035
Children 3 to 5 -0.017 0.040 0.004 0.022 -0.017 0.039
Married -0.006 0.046 -0.091 0.027 -0.065 0.041
Ethnicity:
African American -0.027 0.040 -0.005 0.023 0.106 0.046
Hispanic 0.002 0.070 0.018 0.049 -0.019 0.107
Note: Also included in the regression are a full set of year dummy vari-
ables, four regional location dummy variables, a dummy variable for living in
an SMSA, county of residence unemployment rate, and a set of cohort dummy
variables for the cohorts defined in Table 1.
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Table 4: Wage Equation by Education Group
High School High School College
Dropouts Graduates Graduates
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Constant 7.662 0.139 7.842 0.082 8.143 0.137
Education 0.025 0.006 0.048 0.004 0.040 0.005
Experience 0.064 0.011 0.076 0.005 0.112 0.008
Exp.2/100 -0.359 0.068 -0.467 0.032 -0.577 0.054
Exp.3/1, 000 0.088 0.016 0.123 0.009 0.134 0.015
Exp.4/10, 000 -0.008 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.013 0.001
Seniority 0.072 0.006 0.069 0.004 0.075 0.006
Sen.2/100 -0.301 0.075 -0.285 0.040 -0.395 0.079
Sen.3/1, 000 0.097 0.030 0.077 0.016 0.134 0.034
Sen.4/10, 000 -0.011 0.004 -0.007 0.002 -0.016 0.005
Job Switch in 1st Sample Year:
Job change in 1st year (φs0) -0.006 0.062 0.067 0.027 0.161 0.048
Lagged Experience (φe0) 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.004
Job switches after:
Up to 1 year (φ10) 0.049 0.023 0.109 0.009 0.213 0.017
2 to 5 years (φ20) 0.137 0.028 0.107 0.013 0.157 0.019
6 to 10 years (φ30) 0.215 0.076 0.190 0.042 0.327 0.070
Over 10 years (φ40) 0.057 0.106 0.373 0.054 0.517 0.088
Seniority at Job that Lasted:
2 to 5 years (φs2) 0.026 0.012 0.028 0.005 0.054 0.007
6 to 10 years (φs3) 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.006 0.008 0.010
Over 10 years (φs4) 0.026 0.005 0.035 0.003 0.002 0.006
Experience at Job that Lasted:
Up to 1 year (φe1) 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.002
2 to 5 years (φe2) -0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.001 -0.005 0.002
6 to 10 years (φe3) 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002
Over 10 years (φe4) 0.002 0.003 -0.017 0.002 -0.004 0.003
Notes:
1. Also included in the regressions are a full set of year dummy variables, four
regional location dummy variables, a dummy variable for living in an SMSA, county
of residence unemployment rate, a dummy variable for African American, a dummy
variable for Hispanic, and a set of cohort dummy variables for the cohorts defined in
Table 1.
2. The φ coefficients in parentheses at the bottom part of the table are according to
the definiton of the JW function given in the text.
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Table 5: Estimated Cumulative and Marginal Returns to Experience
Cumulative Returns Marginal Returns (in %)
Group Years of Experience Years of Experience
5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20
HS Dropouts .241 .362 .410 .420 3.442 1.550 0.482 -0.012
(.042) (.062) (.071) (.073) (.597) (.307) (.231) (.232)
HS Graduates .277 .402 .440 .438 3.776 1.447 0.232 -0.234
(.017) (.024) (.028) (.031) (.233) (.142) (.135) (.134)
College Graduates .430 .661 .762 .786 6.339 3.116 1.117 -0.045
(.029) (.044) (.052) (.058) (.421) (.264) (.244) (.244)
Table 6: Estimated Cumulative and Marginal Returns to Seniority
Cumulative Returns Marginal Returns (in %)
Group Years of Seniority Years of Seniority
2 5 10 15 2 5 10 15
HS Dropouts .133 .297 .507 .677 6.128 4.882 3.669 3.242
(.010) (.019) (.024) (.029) (.408) (.236) (.249) (.238)
HS Graduates .127 .283 .475 .616 5.850 4.590 3.215 2.555
(.006) (.011) (.014) (.018) (.227) (.141) (.150) (.150)
College Graduates .136 .294 .477 .615 6.109 4.513 3.035 2.630
(.010) (.019) (.026) (.034) (.412) (.257) (.279) (.272)
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Table 7: Comparison of Alternative Estimates of Cumulative Returns to
Seniority
Panel A. Topel Replication Sample (1968-1983)
Years of Tenure
2 5 10 15
OLS (AW) 0.092 0.188 0.273 0.315
(0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026)
IV1 (AW) 0.053 0.097 0.119 0.123
(0.010) (0.019) (0.028) (0.037)
Panel B. Our Sample (1975-1992)
High School Dropouts College Graduates
Years of Tenure Years of Tenure
2 5 10 15 2 5 10 15
OLS (AW) 0.099 0.197 0.273 0.300 0.068 0.136 0.189 0.208
(0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
IV1 (AW) 0.062 0.112 0.131 0.131 0.043 0.078 0.092 0.090
(0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Our Model 0.133 0.297 0.507 0.677 0.136 0.294 0.477 0.615
(0.010) (0.019) (0.024) (0.029) (0.010) (0.019) (0.026) (0.034)
Note: The first panel estimates are taken from AW, Table 2. The OLS and IV 1 (based on Altonji
and Williams methodology) estimates for high school dropouts and college graduates are based on our
sample extract. The estimates for our model come from Table 6.
42
Table 8: Test of Exogeneity for Family Background Variables
Unobserved Heterogeneity Terms
Model αy αm αw
Specification HA0 HB0 HA0 HB0 HA0 HB0
Quartic AC AC AC AC RJ AC
(.1571) (.2516) (.1932) (.2922) (.0870) (.1812)
Quadratic AC AC AC AC AC AC
(.2224) (.3111) (.3210) (.4091) (.2046) (.2891)
Notes:
(i) The test employed is the usual Wald test. AC denotes that the null hy-
pothesis of all coefficients are zero is accepted, while RJ denotes that this null
hypothesis is rejected.
(ii) The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding p-values for the tests.
(iii) The specific null hypotheses are defined in (19) and (20).
(iv) The set of variables for which the test is applied are: family unearned
income, number of children in the family, number of children age one to two,
number of children age three to five, and marital status (see the raw statistics
for these variables Table 1).
Table 9: Estimates of the Stochastic Elements by Education Group
High School Dropouts High School Graduates College Graduates
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Covariance Matrix of White Noises (Elements of Σ)
ρuv -0.0012 0.0098 -0.0019 0.0072 -0.0021 0.0103
ρuξ -0.0251 0.0069 -0.0323 0.0060 -0.0299 0.0135
ρvξ 0.0100 0.0071 0.0064 0.0049 0.0210 0.0094
σ2ξ 0.2954 0.0038 0.2086 0.0016 0.2048 0.0023
Correlations of Individual Specific Effects (Elements of ∆ρ)
ραyαm -0.1835 0.1762 -0.5024 0.1033 -0.5521 0.0746
ραyαw 0.3572 0.0368 0.3574 0.0262 0.2007 0.0508
ραmαw -0.1846 0.3343 -0.6980 0.1589 -0.7682 0.0739
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